María Daniel Motion to Suppress (Defense)

State of New Jersey v. John Smith

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INTRODUCTION

Please accept this letter brief in support of Defendant’s Motion to Suppress any and all

evidence that was obtained as a result of unlawful stop and frisk of the Defendant.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

On July 9, 2017, Officer Johnson observed Defendant Smith retrieving a cell phone

charger from his vehicle. Officer Johnson questioned Defendant Smith about what he was doing

and Defendant Smith confirmed that he was retrieving his phone charger so that he could go to

work. The Defendant entered his home and then exited approximately five minutes later. Officer

Johnson followed Defendant Smith from his home for about three blocks without incident.

Despite the fact that Officer Johnson did not witness any traffic violations, he stopped Defendant

Smith. Officer Johnson pulled over Defendant Smith and then patted him down for weapons. An

illegal shotgun was found during the pat down.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

POINT 1: The Police Officer did not have Reasonable and

Articulable Suspicion to stop the Defendant.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court established

criteria for an investigative stop and seizure by holding that "where a police officer observes

unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal

activity may be afoot." Id. at 30. In the present case, the officer's statement indicated that he

observed the Defendant retrieving a cell phone charger from his vehicle and then return to his

residence.

The courts have clearly established that the police may stop a motor vehicle if they have a

"reasonable suspicion" that the occupants are engaged in unlawful activity. Delaware v. Prouse,

440 U.S. 648, 663, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1401 (1979); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 442 U.S. 873,

95 S.Ct. 2574 (1975); State v. Egan, 213 N.J. Super. 133, 135 (App. Div. 1986); State v. Barcia,

María Daniel Motion to Suppress (Defense)

State of New Jersey v. John Smith

Page 2 of 3

235 N.J. Super. 311 (App. Div. 1989). The prosecution cannot point to a single infraction of the

NJ Motor Vehicle Code that would give the officer a right to pull over the Defendant. The

officer's motivations or his good faith is immaterial since New Jersey does not recognize a good

faith exception to the Warrant Requirement. State v. Novembrino, 105 N.J. 95 (1987).

Therefore, the stop of Defendant’s vehicle was unlawful and not based on reasonable suspicion.

POINT 2. The Police Officer’s frisk was unreasonable since there

are no facts to justify that the Defendant was armed and dangerous.

In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.1 (1968), the United States Supreme Court established criteria for a

frisk. If an officer believes “that the person with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently

dangerous,…he is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conducted a carefully

limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be

used to assault him." Id. at 30. Defendant Smith did not give the officer any reason to believe he was

carrying a weapon. He was observed with a cell phone. No traffic violations were observed. The officer’s

claim that the Defendant’s tags were not visible does not give rise to a belief that he was armed and

dangerous. Under the totality of circumstances, the frisk of the Defendant was unreasonable.

CONCLUSION

The court should respectfully grant Defendant’s Motion to Suppress.

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María Daniel Motion to Suppress (Defense)

State of New Jersey v. John Smith

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979)

State v. DeLorenzo, 166 N.J. Super. 483 (App. Div. 1979)

State v. Patterson, 270 N.J. Super. 550 (Law Div. 1993)

Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. (1968)